Two Fingers Too Much: Revisiting the ‘Per Vaginal Test’ in State of Gujarat V. Rameshchandra
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55184/dmejl.v1i01.55Keywords:
Rape, Sexual Assault, Two-Finger Test, Dignity, Society, Sexual AutonomyAbstract
State of Gujarat v. Rameshchandra Ramabhai Panchal, as rightly pointed out by Justice Pardiwala, is a case of a ‘unique acquittal’. The Trial Court acquits the accused on the charges of rape but convicts them for kidnapping under the false impression that the victim was a major. Realising the mistake at the point of sentencing, there was nothing that the trial court could have done. The case involves a recurring theme of revisiting the dignity, first as a woman and then as a rape victim. The medical examiner conducts the “two-finger test” and some remarkable observations are made in this regard. This paper deals with two aspects of the judgment; the validity and the history of two-finger test in India and the observations made about why the testimony of the victim should be believed. The court states that the victim should be believed because women face considerable consequences in the society after coming forward with a sexual assault allegation such as, inter alia, difficulty in marriage with ‘adverse publicity’ and victim blaming. The scope of this paper is to show that the judgment ultimately sides with the narrative of the women not because of the weight of the crime and trauma of the victim but because of prevalent societal conditions. This line of reasoning opens the courts to multiple false allegations and reinforces the taboo around rape victims instead of making the society more victim-friendly. The courts should rather strive to ensure sexual autonomy and dignity of a woman as an individual.
References
[i] State of Gujarat v. Rameshchandra Ramabhai Panchal, R/Criminal Appeal No. 122 and 25 of 1996.
[ii] Punishment for kidnapping –Whoever kidnaps any person from [India] or from lawful guardianship, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[iii] Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc – Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall also be punishable as aforesaid.
[iv] Rape – A man is said to commit “rape” who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following descriptions :… … … …. ….
Sixthly – with or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age
[v] Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty, AIR 1996 SC 922.
[vi] State of Karnataka v. Manjanna, 2000 SC (Crl.) 1031.
[vii] Lillu v. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 1784 at 12 (hereinafter “Lillu”).
[viii] Ibid.
[ix] Narayanamma (Kum) v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 5 SCC 728 at 4.
[x] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Munshi, AIR 2009 SC 370.
[xi] Id. at 8.
[xii] AIR 2013 SC 1784 at 13.
[xiii] Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (Act 13 of 2013).
[xiv] The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), s. 375(d).
[xv] Government of India, Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law (January, 2013).
[xvi] Government of India, Guidelines and Protocols for Medico-Legal Care for Survivors/Victims of Sexual Violence, (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2014), available at: https://main.mohfw.gov.in/sites/default/files/953522324.pdf (Last visited on May 5, 2020).
[xvii] Lok Sabha Debates on December 9, 2002, available at: http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Debates/Result13.aspx?dbsl=4846 (Last visited on May 4, 2020).
[xviii] Ibid.
[xix] Law Commission of India, “172th Report on Review of Rape Laws” (March, 2000).
[xx] (1992) 3 SCC 204.
[xxi] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sabir, MANU/UP/0964/201.
[xxii] See, for instance, Raj Kumar @ Raju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2007 CriLJ 1916 (HP); Virender Singh v. State of Haryana, 2007 Cri LJ 2459 (P&H); Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2006 Cri LJ 2530 (Raj).”
[xxiii] Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2005 Cri L J 220; Subtakum Ansari v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand), 2004 Cri L J 2137 (Jhar).
[xxiv] Raj Kumar @ Raju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2007 Cri L J 1916 (HP).
[xxv] Durba Mitra & Mrinal Satish, “Testing Chastity, Evidencing Rape”, 49 Economics and Political Weekly 8 (2014).
[xxvi] Radaˇcíc, Ivana, and Ksenija Turkovíc, “Rethinking Croatian Rape Laws: Force, Consent and The Contribution of the Victim” in Clare McGlynn and Vanessa Munro, Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives 169–183 (Oxon: Routledge, 1st edn., 2010).
[xxvii] Supra note 15.
[xxviii] See for example, State of Punjab v. Gurmeet Singh, 1996 Cri LJ 1728; State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, 1990 Cri LJ 889 and State of H.P. v. Asha Ram, (2005) 13 SCC 766
[xxix] State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990 (1) SCC.
In State of H.P. v. Asha Ram, (2005) 13 SCC 766, Justice H.K. Sema further states that “The evidence of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness. Even minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.
[xxx] Flavia Agnes, “Law, Ideology and Female Sexuality: Gender Neutrality in Rape Law”, 37 Economic and Political Weekly 844 (2002).
[xxxi] Vibha Hetu, “Reflections on the Society’s Reaction towards Rape Victims in Delhi City” 17 Temida 3 (2014) available at: http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/Article.aspx?ID=1450-66371403003H (Last visited on May 4, 2020).
[xxxii] Patricia Uberoi, Social Reform, Sexuality, and The State (Sage, New Delhi, 1996).
[xxxiii] Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty, 1996 AIR 922 at 16.
[xxxiv] National Crime Records Bureau (2017): “Crime in India 2017”, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, available at: https://ncrb.gov.in/crime-india-2017-0 (Last visited on May 5, 2020).
[xxxv] National Crime Records Bureau (2018): “Crime in India 2018”, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, and Available at: https://ncrb.gov.in/crime-india-2018 (Last visited on May 5, 2020).
[xxxvi] Human Rights Watch, “Everyone Blames Me” (8 November, 2017) https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/11/08/everyone-blames-me/barriers-justice-and-support-services-sexual-assault-survivors (Last visited on May 5, 2020).
[xxxvii] Aradhana CV, “We Went Through 45 High Court Judgments of Rape Cases in 2016, So You Don’t Have To. Really, You Don’t Want To” (The Ladies Finger, 4 January 2017) http://theladiesfinger.com/high-court-judgments-2016-in-rape-cases/ (Last visited on May 5, 2020).
[xxxviii] Dinesh v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 3 SCC 771 at 6.