Achieving Federal Equilibrium: A Critical Analysis of Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi V. Union of India (2018)

Authors

  • Anmol Vashisht Advocate, New Delhi,

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.55184/dmejl.v1i01.54

Keywords:

Constitution of India, Cooperative Federalism, Collaborative Federalism, Delhi Government, Lieutenant Governor

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to analyze the Supreme Court’s verdict in Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi v. Union of India (2018 SCC OnLine SC 661) that determined the federal position guaranteed to the national capital. The dispute stems from the unique position enjoyed by Delhi leading to a tussle for power between the governments of the Union and the State. The analysis commences by describing the nature of Union Territories in India, in general, and Delhi, in particular. Delhi enjoys sui generis powers in our Constitutional landscape. The same has been highlighted. The author then continues to explain the existing political framework envisaged under the Indian Constitution. The role played by the State Council of Ministers, the Union Government and the crucial link between the two played by the Lieutenant Governor has been underlined. The judgment speaks of the need for greater democratic devolution to the State and minimal centralization in the Union. The LG has been denuded of any independent decision-making power and his discretion minimized. The author has sought to present objectively the arguments advanced both by the Union and the State of Delhi. Each argument is followed by the verdict of the Delhi High Court and its reversal by the Supreme Court. The rationale for the decision and its critical analysis has been presented as well. The paper concludes with an analytical description of Delhi’s unique constitutional position at the heart of our federal polity. The need for a smooth and harmonious cooperative relationship is fundamental to a democratic federation like India.

References

[i] FP Staff, “AAP’s sit-in protest: Kejriwal writes to Modi, asks for help to end IAS ‘strike’; party to hold candle march at Rajpath”, Firstpost, Jun. 14, 2018, available at: “https://www.firstpost.com/politics/aaps-sit-in-protest-kejriwal-writes-to-modi-asks-for-help-to-end-ias-strike-party-to-hold-candle-march-at-rajpath-4510071.html (Last visited on Sept. 20, 2020).

[ii] For a brief timeline, see: Shivangi Saxena, “Decoding Delhi’s Full Statehood Demand: Chronological Timeline of the Tussle”, BusinessWorld, Jul. 05, 2018, available at:

https://m.dailyhunt.in/news/india/english/business+world-epaper-bizworld/decoding+delhi+s+full+statehood+demand+chronological+timeline+of+the+tussle-newsid-91626126 (Last visited on Sept. 20, 2020).

[iii] Mehal Jain and Manu Sebastian, “Breaking: Delhi Vs LG- LG is Bound by ‘Aid and Advice’ of Elected Govt. He can’t Interfere in Each and Every Decisions of Govt: SC”, Jul. 04, 2018, available at: https://www.livelaw.in/breaking-delhi-vs-lg-lg-is-bound-by-aid-and-advice-of-elected-govt-he-cant-interfere-in-each-and-every-decisions-of-govt-sc/ (Last visited on Sept. 20, 2020).

[iv] (1977) 3 SCC 592. See also: State of Karnataka v. Union of India, (1977) 4 SCC 608.

[v] Chandigarh Administration v. Surinder Kumar, (2004) 1 SCC 530.

[vi] The Constitution of India, art. 246(4).

[vii] Sushil Flour Dal & Oil Mills v. Chief Commissioner, (2000) 10 SCC 593.

[viii] Statement of Objects and Reasons, Constitution (74th Amendment) Bill, 1991.

[ix] (1997) 7 SCC 339.

[x] Delhi and Puducherry have Legislative Assemblies with Council of Ministers. The Administrator for Delhi, Puducherry and Andaman and Nicobar Islands is designated as Lieutenant Governor.

[xi] Judgment on the website of the Supreme Court, available at: https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2016/29357/29357_2016_Judgement_04-Jul-2018.pdf. (Last visited on Sept. 20, 2020).

[xii] Supra note 4.

[xiii] AIR 1974 SC 2192.

[xiv] Supra note 11.

[xv] (2011) 10 SCC 1.

[xvi] (1982) 2 SCC 222.

[xvii] Transaction of Business of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Rules, 1993, Rule 50.

[xviii] Id. at rules 51, 52, 56.

[xix] Supra note 7, art. 239AA (4).

[xx] Supra note 3.

[xxi] Supra note 11.

[xxii] (2016) 8 SCC 1.

[xxiii] Supra note 3.

[xxiv] Ibid.

[xxv] Ibid.

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Published

2021-03-25

How to Cite

Vashisht, A. . (2021). Achieving Federal Equilibrium: A Critical Analysis of Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi V. Union of India (2018). DME Journal of Law, 1(01), 188–197. https://doi.org/10.55184/dmejl.v1i01.54